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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the sentencing purposes for penal penalties,
judges’ perceptions of sentencing purposes and prison sentences,
and the effects of penal sanctions. We examine judges’ positions
towards different penalties, with a focus on imprisonment, since
their views on the different penalties are related to their
sentencing decision-making. Understanding these views is then
critical for several practical and political purposes, including
bridging the gap between academic discourse and legal practice.
We accessed judges’ views on penal sanctions through a
questionnaire and an interview. Our sample is compounded by
the judges of the criminal courts from the three major cities in
Portugal. Despite the most recent criminological empirical
knowledge, judges valued imprisonment as the most adequate
sentence, both for different crimes and for different judicial
purposes. This result is not consistent with viewing imprisonment
as a ‘last resort’ solution. Indeed, we did not find this ‘last resort’
position in our data, and it is not apparent in the judicial statistics
on imprisonment rates. Our data highlight the importance of
increasing judges’ training on criminological and sociological
issues as well as the importance of changing the influence of their
personal beliefs regarding penal sanctions into research-based
positions.
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In the last few decades, several disciplines, such as criminology, have analyzed the criminal
justice system and discussed its implications for society and offenders. One of the most
relevant issues is the effect of penal sanctions, specifically imprisonment, on recidivism
or criminal desistance. The discussion of the effects and use of penal sanctions is often
examined by considering the impacts on offenders and also from a critical perspective
on imprisonment. We argue that an important missing link in this issue is understanding
judges’ sentencing purposes and their penal ideologies, which includes the effects that
judges pursue with their sentences, as well as their attitudes towards using imprisonment
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Andreia de Castro Rodrigues andreiagtcr@gmail.com https://www.linkedin.com/in/andreia-de-castro-
rodrigues-92025210/ CIPsi - University of Minho, R. da Universidade, Braga 4710-057, Portugal Universidade Lusíada of
North (Porto), R. Dr. Lopo de Carvalho, 4369-006 Porto, Portugal
PSYCHOLOGY, CRIME & LAW
https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2018.1511788
compared to alternative sanctions. To understand judges’ choices in deciding a sentence,
it is important to listen to their intentions related to the different penalties and to recog-
nize their perceptions towards differential adequacy. Judges decide sentences in accord-
ance with judicial law and privilege the sanctions they consider the most relevant.
However, the part of the equation that they primarily consider is not always clear in
practice. That is, what do judges want to achieve when they sentence? Specifically,
how is imprisonment valued compared to the other available penalties? Additionally,
are the actual effects of penal sanctions close to judges’ ideas on the potential of the
penalties’?
This paper briefly examines the sentencing purposes for penal sanctions, judges’ per-
ceptions of sentencing purposes, prison sentences, and perceived effects of penal sanc-
tions. We will assess judges’ positions towards different penalties, with a focus on
prison sentences, through quantitative and qualitative data.
Judges’ views on the different penalties are inextricably related to their sentencing
decision-making and, as Andrews and Bonta stated, ‘through their sentencing powers
courts have a tremendous impact on offenders’ (Andrews & Bonta, 2010, p.50). Under-
standing judges’ views on the issues we exposed is critical for several practical and political
purposes, including bridging the gap between academic discourse and sentencing prac-
tice, in order to transform sentencing practice into a research-based approach.
Theories of punishment and sentencing purposes
The rationale underlying the imposition of punishment and penal sanctions is based on
the social contract, in which the state has the power to exert control to avoid social
chaos (Pollock, 2010). However, punishment, as an intentional and avoidable infliction
of harm or suffering, is morally problematic, because it would be considered wrong if it
were not grounded in legal (de Keijser, van der Leeden, & Jackson, 2002; Spohn, 2002).
Thus, punishment must be morally justified (Spohn, 2002). The question of the purpose
of penalties is the baseline question in penal law – and constitutes the penal law paradigm
(Dias, 2001). Despite the longstanding discussion of judges’ discretion, it could be
expected that punishment reflected a solid and commonly shared legitimizing framework
(de Keijser et al., 2002). In reality, the penal law in different contexts incorporate different
and contrasting sentencing purposes. Additionally, a recursive relationship seems to exist
between sentencing practice and the penal ideology of these sentencing purposes upon
which the perceived legitimacy of punishment depends (Henham, 2012). Thus, under-
standing these purposes is an important pathway for understanding the sentencing
process (de Keijser et al., 2002; Spohn, 2002) and the sanctions that judges choose to
impose.
Distinct philosophies of punishment provide different narratives for why and whom to
punish. Therefore, the potential answers to the question of why we punish those who
transgress the law may be categorized according to five sentencing purposes: rehabilita-
tion, general deterrence, special deterrence, incapacitation and retribution (Ashworth,
1996; Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987; Hogarth, 1971; Spohn, 2002).1 Both
general and special deterrence may have positive and negative forms, referring to the
nature of the process, that is, the sentence might reach a special or a general deterrence
through positive or negative means. Positive and negative special deterrence aim to
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rehabilitate or incapacitate the individual. Positive and negative general deterrence aim to
reinforce societal norms or intimidate society with the threat of the sanction.
These sentencing purposes can be classified into two distinct perspectives: utilitarian
(result-based, consequentialist or instrumentalist theories) and retributive (de Keijser
et al., 2002; Spohn, 2002). The retributive theory is a backward-looking, desert-based
approach because it focuses on the offense and the offender and is justified on moralistic
grounds, which is why it is also referred to as retrospective or non-consequential. The uti-
litarian theory, which includes the sentencing that is based on deterrence (special and
general), incapacitation and rehabilitation, focuses on the positive results that the
penalty could achieve and on the future criminal behavior of both the person being pun-
ished and other members of society to justify the punishment as a rational means to deter
crime (Kleck, Sever, Li, & Gertz, 2005; Spohn, 2002).
Another perspective on penal purposes reveals two contrasting attitudes: harsh treat-
ment (deterrence, incapacitation, desert and moral balance) and social constructiveness
(rehabilitation and restorative justice) (de Keijser et al., 2002).
According to retributive theories, the penalty is primarily a retributive and compensatory
instrument thatmakes theoffender pay a fair price for a crime, in equivalence to the imposed
harmand the guilt of the offender (Dias, 2001). In otherwords, retribution is a negative-social
doctrine that has questionable compatibility withmodern law principles. That doctrine may
be illegitimate in the rule of lawbecause the state should be limited to protecting legal assets
andnot acting as a ‘sanctioning entity of the sin’ (Dias, 2001, p.71). Also, Spohn (2002) argued
that ‘if no “good consequences” would result from punishing an individual, no punishment
would be justified’ (Spohn, 2002, p. 9). Additionally, the ‘new penology’ movement asserts
that offenders should be treated rather than punished (Kaufman, 1973).
In contrast, deterrence theories claim that a sanction should be a preventive instrument
that results in but is not limited to harm for the offender because it is obligated to achieve
the positive-social goal of crime prevention. Specifically, special deterrence doctrines
maintain that the sanction should aim to prevent recidivism, deterring the offender
from committing future crimes; this deterrence occurs through his/her social reintegration
and rehabilitation (Dias, 2001). According to this author, deterrence is an essential senten-
cing purpose that reveals harmony with the role of penal law in preventing recidivism. The
state should only inflict a penalty that causes harm to an individual when a positive-social
goal can be associated with that harm (Dias, 2001; Spohn, 2002).
Is it possible to base a judicial system on just one sole sentencing purpose? This ques-
tion calls for a discussion of the ‘cafeteria systems’ that were discussed by Mackenzie
(2005), in which the plurality of available and legitimate aims brings with it the potential
for inconsistency (Mackenzie, 2005). In contrast, Dias (2001) provides two examples to illus-
trate how the defense of an overriding sentencing purpose, even if it is special deterrence,
inevitably entails conflicts and paradox. On one hand, a penalty is justified through the
need for rehabilitation, which could result in inhuman punishments for minor offenses,
which are frequently associated with a persistent criminality and a continued need for
resocialization. On the other hand, it is difficult to apply these principles to situations
where socialization and rehabilitation might not be relevant – for example, to some econ-
omic crimes or in some kinds of passionate homicide, where the probability of a new crime
is almost non-existent. In these situations, we might question if the need to apply a sanc-
tion does not represent sentencing purposes close to retribution.
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As such, sentencing purposes should essentially be preventive – whether through
general or special deterrence – which suggests that penal sanctions should primarily
aim to prevent future crimes and restore the juridical peace that was undermined by
the offense (Antunes, 2013; Dias, 2001).
These sentencing purposes are put into practice in different judicial systems. As the
present study has been conducted in Portugal, we introduce a brief explanation about
the Portuguese criminal justice system, namely the process of prosecution and sentencing.
In Portugal, the process at the prosecution is organized on a national basis. After a crime
is uncovered or reported, the execution of acts of investigation is led by a public prosecu-
tor and issued or authorized by an investigating judge. If investigation gives sufficient evi-
dence about the commission of the crime, the case goes to court for trial. Portuguese
criminal system follows an inquisitorial procedure so a single judge or a bench of three
judges have the complete control of the proceedings, inspecting the facts of the case
and the evidence, hearing the defendant, witnesses, forensics, etc. Independently of
what happened in previous steps as, for example, police interrogation, judges must
decide during the judgment if each fact presented at court is proved or not. Then, the
public prosecutor requests a verdict and a penalty. After oral procedure, judges deliberate
about how the facts fit a particular crime as defined by the penal code and which the limits
of the penalties for this particular crime are. After that, judges must weigh the specific
characteristics of each case, as we describe above, and define the concrete penalty
(sentencing).
Portuguese criminal sentencing is based on civil law tradition, which strongly guides
sentencing by the writing penal and procedural codes. Penalties and their minimum
and maximum limits are defined by the law for each offense as well as penal purposes
of sentencing (e.g. retribution is not supposed to be the purpose for sentencing). Portu-
guese criminal law provides two mandatory penalties: prison and fine. Prison penalty
can be substituted by other non-custodial sanctions as fine, suspended prison term, or
community service, between others. Still, penalties can lead associated ancillary sanctions
such as the prohibition of driving (e.g. driving without a license crime) or the obligation to
respect certain rules of conduct. If a specific crime could be penalized with custodial and
non-custodial penalties, criminal law establishes that court should prefer non-custodial
penalties (art. 70 of Portuguese Penal Code). Only prison sentences under 5 years of impri-
sonment can be suspended. The judge must decide for a particular sanction depending on
the specific characteristics of each case, namely, mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances, social alarm, etc. The discretionary power of judges is particularly evident at
this moment because these characteristics of each case must be weighed by the judges
without specific procedure guides.
In practice, if it is not feasible to select a single overriding aim and there are no pre-
scribed proposes for the specific categories of offense or offender, we raise the same ques-
tion as Mackenzie (2005): how are purposes implemented? And, we add, howmuch do the
different penalties judges may impose respond to each purpose?
Judges’ perceptions of sentencing purposes and prison sentences
The sentences that judges impose, as well the potential discrepancies among the sen-
tences, are strongly related to the penal philosophies and attitudes of the judges
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(Carroll et al., 1987; Hogarth, 1971; McFatter, 1978). Mackenzie (2005) referred to the lack of
consistency and accountability in applying sentencing aims and purposes after describing
how judges differed in the use of purpose for specific offenses.
These attitudes appear to be involved in the way that information is perceived during
the sentencing process (de Keijser et al., 2002). As such, penal philosophies and attitudes
predispose judges who sentence to respond to certain types of crime in specific ways that
are based on their personal beliefs about what the penalties are supposed to achieve and
their different adequacies (Hogarth, 1971; Spohn, 2002). In his classic study, Hogarth (1971)
found that although judges believe that it is their role to prevent crime through senten-
cing, they had differing ideas on how to prevent crime and the penalties’ effects.
Judges believed in the efficacy of the penal sanctions that they imposed but largely dis-
agreed about the effectiveness of each sanction (Hogarth, 1971). In that study, judges
differed in their penal philosophies but had individual and consistent beliefs that were
based on those penal philosophies (Hogarth, 1971). Additionally, besides having reason-
able differences regarding their colleagues’ penal philosophies (Hogarth, 1971), the
judges did not appear to be sensitive to the importance of the sentencing purpose,
sharing the idea that the sentencing purpose was not a high priority in the sentencing
process (Mackenzie, 2005).
Additionally, many of the judges’ sentencing considerations on penal philosophies and
sentencing purposes appeared to be based on judges’ experiences in court, as opposed to
the aims and purposes that are prescribed by law or criminological theories of punishment
(Mackenzie, 2005). In addition to raising the issue about the connections (or absence of
them) between academic evidence, prescribed laws and sentencing practices (Mackenzie,
2005), this point reinforces the idea that imposing a penal sanction is marked with incon-
sistencies between intentions and implementation (Pollock, 2010). Besides, previous
studies raise the question of the extent to which legal norms and processes facilitate
the transformation of sentencing purposes (or penal ideologies as the author states)
into guides for action through the routine practice of sentencing (Henham, 2012).
As such, we argue that it is important to understand judges’ perceptions and attitudes
towards the sanctions they inflict to inform the development and imposition of a conti-
nuum of penalties that accurately embodies criminal justice system principles (Moore,
May, & Wood, 2008).
In relation to penal philosophies and the purposes for sentencing, Mackenzie (2005)
found that judges mentioned the balancing theme, as they did when discussing the sen-
tencing process in general. de Keijser et al. (2002) also noted that judges’ attitudes did not
tend to mirror a specific moral framework but instead merged into a ‘more streamlined
and pragmatic approach to punishment’ (de Keijser et al., 2002, p. 333).
As early as in Hogarth’s study (1971), individual deterrence and retributive punishment
appear to assume greater significance in the actual sentencing than in judges’ images of
their behavior, as they gave little weight to those two philosophies, when questioned.
Under a philosophy of community protection and offenders’ correction through punish-
ment, judges found legitimacy in imposing rather severe penalties (Hogarth, 1971).
Several decades later, Mackenzie (2005) reinforced that when judges claimed to be
using deterrence, in many cases, they were sentencing based on just deserts or retribution.
The discussion on the extent to which the administration of penal sanctions and,
specifically, imprisonment, is justifiable as a punishment for crime is not new and
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reflects the ‘prison dilemma’ (Kaufman, 1973). Although judges believe that prison is the
most punitive sanction (Moore et al., 2008), statistics show that judges are strongly
oriented towards using prison, as imprisonment is treated more as an option of choice
(Spohn, 2002) or the default sanction rather than as a last resort (Maguire, 2014). While
this may be the result of limited sentencing options instead of a desire for punitive and
tough sentences, it may also reflect the narrow and punitive attitudes that dominate
the system (Maguire, 2014).
In addition, Tata (2016) argues that the idea of last resort, in a certain way, makes it
possible for the prison to be the only option that does not have to prove itself, because
it can always be imposed using justification that no other options seem to work (Tata,
2016). In fact, that was one of the three circumstances that judges highlighted as a poss-
ible exception for using prison as a last resort, combined with the seriousness of the
offense and the persistence of the offender (Maguire, 2014). Maguire (2014) also revealed
that judges had certain ‘pet hates’, as some crimes are so serious that judges believe they
must employ a severe approach. This study showed that judges agree with the principle of
last resort in theory, but, in practice, they often depart from it based on the demands of the
case. As such, Maguire (2014) concludes that ‘current definitions of the last resort are
vague, malleable and easily manipulated by judges to fit their interpretation of when it
is appropriate to use prison as a sanction’ (p. 16).
Indeed, it is not easy to define the endpoint at which prison can be used as a last resort
or to identify when ‘enough is enough’, and it is not clear how judges make this decision,
although they believe that their decisions are clear (Maguire, 2014; Tombs & Jagger, 2006).
The situations for which judges concluded that prison was the only option, usually for
dealing with persistent offenders and minor offenses, ‘clearly revealed an underlying retri-
butivism, aimed not at the offence, but at the offender’ (Tombs & Jagger, 2006, p. 818). This
reasoning allows us to question the validity of Kaufman’s (1973) conclusion that retribu-
tion was the primary, if not the only, purpose that most correctional sanctions served.
Simultaneously, judges believe that sending someone to prison is very difficult, and
they appear to be skeptical about the effects of imprisonment – especially the extent to
which prison sentences achieve their traditional purposes, specifically individual deter-
rence – and are aware of reoffending rates (Mackenzie, 2005; Tombs & Jagger, 2006).
Although this skepticism was also manifested towards the potential for prison rehabilita-
tion and the effectiveness of the programs that are available in the system (Mackenzie,
2005), judges believed that sending some individuals – often grossly deprived people –
to jail could provide these offenders with access to rehabilitative treatment and care
that is not available to in the community (Tombs & Jagger, 2006).
Several important problems that were related to the prison system were also raised by
the judges who participated in Mackenzie’s study. These problems included the following:
the inadequacy of prisons for some offenders due to their circumstances; the fact that
prison is, at best, a temporary solution to someone’s criminality; and the conflict between
pretending to foster an offender’s responsibility for his/her life and offending behavior
and a penalty that strips them of almost all responsibilities and decisions (Mackenzie, 2005).
Despite the known challenges, prison sentences are currently used worldwide. Accord-
ing to Tombs and Jagger (2006), prison use is related to a normalization of routine impri-
sonment by deploying a series of techniques of neutralization, including denying
alternatives, appealing to a higher authority, routinization, appealing to necessity, refusing
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empathy, interpretative denial, moral prioritizing, and role distancing. In Portugal, the
latter technique is facilitated by the fact that the judge who sentences is not the judge
who applies and monitors the penalty’s enforcement.
The effects of penal sanctions
There are two different rationales for prison sentences. The first asserts that locking
offenders behind bars will reduce recidivism by teaching them and their communities
that ‘crime does not pay’, as imprisonment is a painful and costly penalty. An alternative
perspective was primarily developed by criminologists, and views imprisonment not
simply as a ‘cost’ but also as a social experience that deepens illegal involvement
(Cullen, Jonson, & Nagin, 2011). Indeed, as it has been functioning, imprisonment has
not been shown to have a positive and significant impact on recidivism (Andrews &
Bonta, 2010; Bales & Piquero, 2012; Beijersbergen, Dirkzwager, & Nieuwbeerta, 2016;
Cochran, Mears, & Bales, 2014; Cullen et al., 2011; Lipsey & Cullen, 2007).
Globally, there is variation in the effects of prison as a deterrent, depending on several
factors, such as the type of offender (Cullen et al., 2011; Ritchie, 2011), the nature of the
prison experience and the history of prior sanctions (Mears, Cochran, & Cullen, 2015).
Furthermore, several studies assert that prison does not reduce reoffending more than
non-custodial sanctions (Cochran et al., 2014; Cullen et al., 2011), considering all crimes
and all offenders (Ritchie, 2011). Many authors even argue that a criminogenic effect is,
at least, plausible (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011), based on an increase in recidivism compared
to non-custodial sentences (Bales & Piquero, 2012; Gendreau, Goggin, & Cullen, 1999), a
higher probability for developing an oppositional culture (Listwan, Sullivan, Agnew,
Cullen, & Colvin, 2013), a feeling of resentment towards society (Sherman, 1993), and
the strengthening of a deviant identity (Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga, 1992). As such,
it is not logical to choose a prison sentence to reduce future crimes. Thus, imprisonment
should only be imposed for specific groups of offenders and only when it is expected to
have better results than non-custodial sanctions (Cullen et al., 2011).
Despite the evidence that suggests that imprisoning individuals is, without additional
rehabilitative measures, inadequate for reducing recidivism and promoting rehabilitation
(Lipsey & Cullen, 2007), prison sentences are used all over the world.
For example, in Portugal, as well as in many other countries, there has not been a
decrease in the use of imprisonment sanctions, notwithstanding several important
changes in the law. For example, changes in the law allow for sentences that are less
than 5 years to be suspended, have decriminalized drug use and have increased the use
of alternative sanctions, such as community service and electronic monitoring. Indeed, in
2017, the 49 Portuguese prisons continued to be over capacity, with an average occupation
rate of 108.9%, comprising 13,943 inmates (World Prison brief – Institute for Criminal Policy
Research, Retrieved fromwww.prisonstudies.org). According to this international database,
Portugal ranks 25th out of the 56 European positions for the prison population rate (ranked
from highest to lowers) and ranks 8th for occupancy level. Additionally, comparisons
between the numbers of custodial and non-custodial sentences show that both imprison-
ment and non-custodial sentences rates continue to grow (after a decline on prison sen-
tences in 2008, which is probably related to the introduction of a law that allowed
sentences that were less than 5 years to be suspended) (Direção Geral de Reinserção e
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Serviços Prisionais, Retrieved from http://www.dgrs.mj.pt/web/rs/estat). According to
national official statistics, on 31 December 2016, 13,779 prison sentences were being
enforced, in contrast to 7126 terms of community service and 14,762 suspended prison
sentences.
Thus, it appears that there is a gap between criminological empirical knowledge and
sentencing practices, as these two processes seem to operate independently.
This gap between the lack of evidence for the benefits of prison terms and the contin-
ued high rates of imprisonment, as well as an absence of significant decreases in prison
sentences despite changes in the law, may suggest, as Tombs and Jagger (2006) assert,
that judges decide sentences not only based on the impositions of the law but also in
line with their own beliefs about the penalties’ differential potentials and disadvantages.
Additionally, since moral and social values and the way these values impact punishment
are in a constant change, descriptive accounts or discussions of the possible paradoxes in
criminal justice are insufficient to understanding the forces that actually drive these
changes (Henham, 2012).
All of this calls for the importance of studying judges who are actually involved in sen-
tencing practice, on their perceptions about penalties, since these perceptions should be
related to their sentencing decision-making process. As Henham states, ‘more emphasis
should be given explaining the moral foundations that underpin human perceptions of
“justice” in sociological accounts of the “reality” of sentencing’ (2012, p.80).
In this paper, we aim to explore judges’ perceptions about sentences purposes and
penalties efficacy (particularly prison sentence). Thus, we ask the following questions:
How judges assess the different sanctions to distinct crimes and the sentencing purposes?
How do they qualify imposing a prison sentence compared to the other available alternatives
when deciding a sentence?
We used a questionnaire and in-depth interviews to address these questions. The ques-
tionnaire mainly covers the former, assessing judges’ perceptions about the adequacy of
sentencing purposes to different crimes and the adequacy of distinct penal sanctions to
the same crimes. By the other hand, the interview explored judges’ discourses about
penalties, in particular the prison sentence, revealing their ideas about its efficacy, the dis-
tinction between a practical and abstract discussion on penalties and imprisonment fea-
tures, as well, as the personal experience of applying penalties and prison sentences.
Data and methods
Instruments and data collection procedures
The data reported in this paper were collected with two different methods – a question-
naire and an interview. The goal was to complement the quantitative findings with in-
depth information to allow for an exploration and understanding of the previous results.
These instruments were developed as part of a larger research project (Castro Rodri-
gues & Sacau, 2012, 2014, 2015), but this paper focuses on the contents that are related
to the prison sentence.
The questionnaire was developed for this purpose and was based on previous similar
studies (Carroll et al., 1987; Hogarth, 1971; Mackenzie, 2005; Sobral & Prieto, 1994) as
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well as on our observations from several court sessions. The questionnaire was a self-
report assessment and was organized into 10 groups of items, plus socio-demographic
and political questions. The final questionnaire was revised by two retired judges to
assure that it was suitable for the intended purpose and target population with respect
to vocabulary, question formulation and sensitive issues. The questionnaire was given
directly to the judges in their courts during the initial research phase.
The questionnaire is composed by 10 groups of items covering topics as causes and
justifications for crime, sentencing aims and penal ideologies, aspects related to the
offender, to the judge, to the criminal act, considerations about the different criminal sanc-
tions, between many others; plus a socio-demographic information section. There were
two groups of questions that assessed judges’ views on prisons. One group evaluated
judges’ perceptions of the adequacy of the different penalties (cautions, fines, community
service, suspended prison sentences, prison) for the legal purposes that sentences may
pursue (retribution, rehabilitation, positive special deterrence, negative special deterrence,
positive general deterrence, negative general deterrence, and incapacitation), while the
other group assessed the adequacy of different penalties for different crimes (drug-
related offenses, sexual crimes, economic crimes, theft/burglary, and homicide).
The items that are included in this paper were scored on a five-point Likert scale that
ranged from ‘not at all’ (point 1) to ‘totally’ (point 5). For the five-point Likert scale, we
defined values from 1 to 2.50 as low, 2.51 to 3.50 as neutral, and 3.51 to 5 as high.
An in-depth interview followed a semi-structured interview guide, composed of 30
questions. The initial version of the interview guide was piloted by two of the judges
from Porto court to examine the suitability, accuracy and clarity of the questions, as
well as the impact of the number of questions, which resulted in the final version.
The interviews were conducted in a later phase of the research, after being in court for
almost a year, to maximize the judges’willingness and comfort in speaking to the research
team. Interviews were scheduled according to each judge’s availability.
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data were analyzed
through a process of content analysis. A codification grid was developed through an
inductive process, that is generating categories from the material obtained, and codifying
the units according to their semantic proximity. The units coded were defined as the
judges’ ideas exposed in the interviews, which is a choice most suitable to spontaneous
discourses than sentences or paragraphs are. The codification of the material was con-
trolled by an independent judge, through a process of co-encoding, both for generating
the codification grid, and to codify the material, in an initial phase of the codification, until
reaching a total agreement. In the end of the codification, the units in each category were
checked by the two researchers to warrant their semantic proximity and their adequacy to
the category where they were codified.
Data collection took place during the years of 2009 and 2010.
Participants
A total of 49 judges from the criminal courts in the three larger cities in Portugal com-
pleted the questionnaires (27 from Lisbon, 14 from Porto and 8 from Coimbra). All of
the judges from these courts were personally and individually contacted to fulfill the ques-
tionnaire and no one refused to participate in the study. Therefore, our sample
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corresponds to the population of judges actively working on those courts, in the period of
data collection. The sample was gender balanced and included 26 women. Participants’
ages ranged between 32 and 55 years old (M = 44.5, SD = 5.5). For professional experience,
the least experienced judge had five years of experience, while the most experienced
judge had 23 years of experience (M = 16.1; SD = 4.6).
The respondents to the in-depth interviews were all the judges in Porto, except for the
two who had participated in the pilot testing of the interview guide, resulting in a total of
12. This group of judges was chosen because their court was the primary research location.
It was the court in which the observations that guided the methodological definitions
occurred and, consequently, where we developed trusting relationships with the
judges, which allowed them to be properly and sufficiently involved in the interviews
and maximized the genuineness of their viewpoints.
Results
Study 1 – the questionnaire
The adequacy of the different penalties for different judicial purposes and crimes
As previously mentioned, this section of the questionnaire examined the degree to which
judges believed that each of the most utilized penalties of Portuguese legal code was ade-
quate for each different judicial purposes that sentencing might pursue and each category
of crimes. In order to compare the adequacy of each penalty we perform, for each of
different purposes or crimes, a repeated-measures general linear model, with a least sig-
nificant difference adjustment for multiple comparisons. A significant difference between
the estimated marginal means shows the different evaluation of each penalty to achieve a
purpose or to respond to a specific crime.
The results are described in Table 1.
Our data revealed that there are significant differences among judges in the way they
assess the ability of each penalty to achieve sentencing purposes, as well as each penalty
adequacy for different crimes.
In relation to sentencing purposes, prison term was considered the most suitable
penalty in order to achieve all sentencing purposes except rehabilitation, showing signifi-
cant differences with all remaining penalties. Such suitability of prison includes retribution,
special and general deterrence and incapacitation purposes. This belief might explain the
high rate of imprisonment shown by official statistics. In contrast, caution was systemati-
cally the most devalued. Fines, community service and suspended imprisonment were
assessed near the mid-point of the scale.
Judges considered that rehabilitation is more achievable through community service
and suspended imprisonment but not through prison term or other sanction. In line with
this, if judges valued rehabilitation as a main purpose for sentencing it could be expectable
a higher use of non-custodial sentences. Unexpectedly, the ability of prison term to achieve
incapacitation purposes although having the higher score was valued as neutral, even
though a prison term may be the penalty that can most effectively incapacitate individuals
from committing crimes, during imprisonment. Additionally, prison was also considered
highly adequate to achieve positive special purpose, even though this is not congruent
to the recent results of rehabilitation literature, since this aim is focused on deterring the
individual from committing more crimes through positive means.
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Table 1. Adequacy of the penalties to the judicial purposes and to different crimes.
Caution Fine Community service Suspended prison term Prison term
M (SD) Min–max M (SD) Min–max M (SD) Min–max M (SD) Min–max M (SD) Min–max F (df)
Sentencing purposes
Retribution 2.52a (1.03) 1–5 3.40b (.79) 2–5 3.44b (.99) 2–5 3.51b (1.00) 1–5 4.41c (.67) 3–5 26.526** (4.44)
Rehabilitation 3.42a (1.27) 1–5 3.35a (1.06) 1–5 4.04b (.96) 2–5 3.98b (.95) 1–5 3.31a (.98) 1–5 9.295** (4.44)
Positive special deterrence 3.50a (1.19) 1–5 3.52a (.95) 1–5 3.94b (.93) 2–5 3.92b (.79) 2–5 3.96b (.85) 2–5 6.314** (4.44)
Negative special deterrence 2.76a (1.05) 1–5 3.23b (.98) 1–5 3.25b (1.02) 1–5 3.35b (1.18) 1–5 3.85c (1.12) 1–5 8.802** (4.41)
Positive general deterrence 2.79a (1.22) 1–5 3.31b (.90) 1–5 3.58c (.94) 2–5 3.50bc (.74) 2–5 4.31d (.72) 3–5 13.445** (4.44)
Negative general deterrence 2.38a (1.11) 1–5 2.90b (.99) 1–5 2.94b (.94) 1–5 3.06b (1.04) 1–5 3.96c (1.13) 1–5 12.936** (4.42)
Incapacitation 1.75a (.91) 1–4 1.94b (.95) 1–4 1.96b (1.04) 1–4 2.14b (1.12) 1–4 2.67c (1.38) 1–5 4.685* (4.43)
Crimes
Drug-related offenses 1.65a (.96) 1–5 1.98b (.90) 1–4 3.22c (1.03) 1–5 3.49cd (.94) 1–5 3.90d (.92) 1–5 59.970** (4.44)
Sexual crimes 1.24a (.56) 1–3 1.41b (.67) 1–3 1.90c (1.03) 1–5 2.84d (1.16) 1–5 4.23e (.78) 1–5 115.671** (4.44)
Economic crimes 1.71a (1.02) 1–5 2.98b (1.22) 1–5 2.84b (1.18) 1–5 3.35c (.97) 2–5 3.57c (.94) 1–5 27.522** (4.45)
Theft/burglary 1.92a (1.04) 1–5 2.61b (1.00) 1–4 3.16c (1.05) 1–5 3.51d (.87) 1–5 3.69d (.94) 1–5 26.482** (4.45)
Homicide 1.02a (.14) 1–2 1.12ab (.33) 1–2 1.33b (.77) 1–5 2.08c (1.17) 1–5 4.55d (.91) 1–5 170.649** (4.44)
Notes: Scale 1–5. Repeated measures: different letters reflect a significant difference between the estimated marginal means.













Overall, we must point out that as the severity of the penalty increases (from caution to
imprisonment), the mean score for each judicial purpose also increases, with the exception
of rehabilitation. This result seems to reveal a judges’ tendency to believe that the fulfill-
ment of sentencing purposes is related to the severity of the sanction.
Results also show some variability of judges’ positions about the adequacy of each
penalty to the different sentence purposes. For most penalties including prison term,
the range of the assessment of their ability to fit different sentencing purposes is
between 1 and 5 (see Table 1). An analysis of the range of the responses and also the stan-
dard deviations revealed that the higher variability occurred when judges assessed the
adequacy of caution to the different sentencing purposes, and of the adequacy of sus-
pended imprisonment and imprisonment to achieve incapacitation and negative special
or negative general deterrence. Some exceptions to this high variability occurred: the
assessment of the capability of prison term to achieve retribution and positive general
deterrence purposes (with a score variation between 3 and 5 points and a low standard
deviation); and, the assessment of suspended imprisonment to achieve positive general
or positive special deterrence.
In relation to the adequacy of each penalty to different crimes, again, prison term is the
most valued penalty, especially when considering sexual crimes and homicide. Regarding
drug-related crimes, economic crimes and theft/burglary, prison still reveals higher means
even though not significantly different to the possibility of suspended prison. In contrast,
caution was the most devalued penalty for all crimes.
Our data also showed a variability of the assessments of the adequacy of the penalties
to the different crimes, with exception, as expected, to the application of caution and fines
to homicide and sexual crimes. Interestingly, judges vary in their positions between the
two extremes of the scale when evaluating the adequacy of the prison sentence for all
different crimes. This discrepancy is also showed when judges assessed community
service and suspended prison term.
Study 2 – the interviews
The interview content that was related to prison sentences were coded into four categories:
the efficacy of the different penalties; prison in the abstract sense, that is, what should it be
and what it should it seek to do; prison in the practical sense, that is, what it may achieve
and what it is; and the personal experience of imposing terms of imprisonment.
The efficacy of the different penalties
Several judges believed that it was difficult to have an opinion on the efficacy of the
different penalties, placing the onus on the way inmates live – in other words, the
penalty that is assumed by each individual.
I think that it has to do with so many things, you know? Let’s say, for example, someone that
does not have any purpose in life, just sitting on a wall all day [just doing nothing all day], it
might be the same to be seated in a wall or to be seated in a cell … It may be … But it may
not … Sometimes, all that is necessary is to find a girlfriend or a boyfriend … other times, it
only takes having a child, other times they have all of that and nothing matters and they keep
committing crimes, I don’t know, I have no idea … I think that the human being is so complex
and the situations are so diverse that I can’t say.
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There was often skepticism regarding the penalties’ effectiveness. Specifically, except
for the prison sentence, which should scare people, judges viewed the other sanctions
as not taken seriously by the individuals. This position is demonstrated with an example
of a suspended prison term, which many defendants perceive as an acquittal. Underlying
these judges’ views appears to be a criterion for the efficacy of the penalties that is based
on their degree of punitiveness, rather than their rehabilitation potential.
People seem to think that they can do everything and nothing will happen to them. And so
… it seems that they are only afraid of a prison sentence. The rest is seen as ‘ok, so I guess I
was convicted on that’, some of them don’t accept any of that, they even laugh about it … I
have already judged several cases of driving with a blood alcohol level or driving without a
license, you know, for which the sentence doesn’t work at all … I guess that they would
be capable of going away from the court where they had just been convicted and driving
again … Overall, I think the penalties … I don’t know if this is not to believe in the justice
system, when you say that the penalties don’t work at all, but you know…
There was also a different view that was focused on the rehabilitation of the individuals.
The penalty considered to have a substantial potential for resocialization was probation,
which includes monitoring and is often imposed for small- and medium-scale crimes. In
contrast, community service is mentioned in a divisive manner, as some judges believe
that it is very effective for rehabilitation, while others discredit it, and the latter usually
occurs after having previous failures with its application.
Another issue that was mentioned was the criticism of recent changes in the penalties
implementation law with respect to their definition and enforcement, which appears to
address more economic than effectiveness-oriented criteria. Examples of these changes
include reducing the amount of time served to be able to apply for a conditional
release or the generalized application of electronic monitoring.
Another criticism was related to the rehabilitating effect of prison sentences. Neverthe-
less, incarceration was viewed as the only penalty that had punitive power or the potential
to reduce the commitment of new crimes.
These judges made several suggestions to improve the penalties effectiveness. First,
they recommended widespread use of weekend detention and the day release, specifi-
cally for recurrent minor offenses, such as driving without a license or with an illegal
alcohol level. In contrast to prison terms, these penalties allow the offender to maintain
his professional situation and remain connected to familiar and social bonds. Another
potentially useful measure was to sentence individuals to short prison terms to have a
strong impact on the offender without incapacitation or disconnection from the realities
to which they will return.
Another criticism focused on the inconsistency of the justice system towards different
crimes, for example, comparing the penal frameworks of theft and sexual crimes (penalties
are higher in the first case). Moreover, for enforcing penalties, some judges indicated that
drug dealers usually serve a higher proportion of their sentence (5/6) before they can
request a conditional release compared to serious crimes that include harm to humans
(in some cases, these offenders might be eligible in the middle of their sentence).
We have to make distinctions, otherwise … because the drug dealers that go inside for 4
years have to serve 5/6 and the guys who are trampling people may just serve half of the sen-
tence, you know? It is not credible, even for society!
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The importance of being thorough when determining sentences was highlighted so
that a non-reasonable sequence of suspended penalties would not ultimately result in
such a long prison sentence that it would compromise an individual’s life.
An incorrect suspended sentence is a half way for a sequence of sentences to be served.
Because a wrong positive prognosis means that the offender will commit another crime, for
which he will eventually be convicted, which, although not automatically, will lead him to
incarceration, due to the revocation of the suspension of the sentence. Then, he will serve
the first and the second sentences. And meanwhile, if other judges did the same with that
guy, that is, if he has concurrent convictions, he will serve all of them. That is, a wrong positive
prognosis may ruin a person’s life. One may think that it is making a generous legal interpret-
ation but could be doing the worst for the offender.
Overall, we denoted a (more or less explicit) disbelief in offenders’ resocialization. Several
judges emphasized the importance of the penalties that curb illicit behavior, as it is an
essential condition for offenders to initiate the processes of change.
For many years, I believed that people were disposed not to offend, but nowadays, I am
obliged to agree that without repressive measures, people don’t accept rules. Although I
believe that it is possible to change people and resocialize them, without repression,
people won’t do it.
This is an interesting perspective because it denotes a type of learned punitiveness and
disbelief in the system but also shows that resocialization was generally viewed in a sim-
plistic manner. Indeed, in their discourse, many judges viewed resocialization as an
obvious or linear process that is derived from giving an individual the possibility of
serving a prison sentence in a suspended form, as something that linearly occurs inside
the prisons, or when forced by something aversive. Regardless, the complexity of the
process of personal change and reorganizing criminal careers are often devalued or not
sufficiently addressed.
Prison in the abstract sense
This category reviews contents that are related to the purpose of the prison and the aims
that are intended to pursue, in abstract, in addition the contents related to what prison
should be, how it should function and the limitations to this optimal functioning.
The most frequently discussed aims that imprisonment should pursue were general
deterrence (providing society with a message that crime has consequences) and punish-
ing the offenders. Negative special deterrence and re-socializing delinquents were also
mentioned, although these were often viewed as more theoretical than achievable aims.
General deterrence, which is a message to society or to some individuals that may fall in the
commission of crimes: ‘watch yourself, this could happen to you’ … It is a message to society
that ‘after all, justice works, that means that these guys that do this and that, will pay, will go to
prison’ … On the other hand, for the offender, the penalty should work also as a punishment,
we cannot evade the question, but it is a punishment with a view to his rehabilitation – that is,
we have that intention, it is not possible, in reality, but ideally it is intended…
Some judges stated that the imprisonment period itself had a potential rehabilitative
effect because it is a time that allows for reflection and creates conditions for acquiring
emotional and professional skills.
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May that period be a time for internalization and positive evolution towards the right for the
construction of that personality…
Several judges noted, as skeptic and optimistic on prison potentials, that there were fail-
ures in implementing the sentence. The most frequently stated concern was the inefficacy
of promoting offenders’ rehabilitation, as provided by law, due to the lack of resources.
Many believed that achieving this rehabilitation aim depended on putting inmates to
work, as work is essential for promoting inmates’ inclusion, and fostering professional
skills that will be required in the future.
There is a modesty regarding putting offenders to work! I think that they should have to work
inside prisons. They should be kept busy, looking for competencies, even professional ones, to
be able to become mechanics, bricklayers, mathematicians, for those who were willing to
study, you know? That possibility should exist … It should be explained to them … That
had to be done … And so they should not be able to stand there doing nothing! Or at
least, if they wanted to stand that way, the others should have some kind of advantage …
A reduction in the prison term, something … The possibility of a conditional release…
One judge mentioned that prisons should function in a way that is analogous to the old
district prisons, which, in his opinion, were closer for offenders and rarely mixed distinct
inmates, whether in terms of crimes, ages, or attitudes inside the prison. The potential
for working with individuals in similar conditions is highlighted as an important condition
for fostering rehabilitation during the completion of the penalty. In addition, overcrowding
is an obstacle to rehabilitating inmates. The importance of defining a limit for the prison
term was also mentioned, as it may provide the inmate with a foreseeable end that could
motivate his/her involvement in preparing for the future.
Prison in the practical sense
The third category includes contents that are related to the specific aims that imprison-
ment seeks to achieve, as well as the contents that are related to how prisons actually
work.
Judges believed that the main purpose of imprisonment is general deterrence, that is,
the message to society on the consequences of committing crimes and the effectiveness
of justice in protecting citizens and communities.
Above all is the societal security … Usually when we arrest someone … We won’t do it
unless we think that person is doing harm to society. I think that is the main principle and I
think that … it is just for that prisons exist. Above all, that focus on societal insecurity …
under the control of the penitentiary system…
For those who are convicted, the most frequently discussed goal was preventing new
crimes and protecting the convicted from himself with physical constraints.
Social reintegration works only in the theory … On various occasions, I gave an individual a
suspended sentence and then, after some months, another suspended sentence, and another,
until I cannot do it anymore and I have to arrest him. And then we know that sending an indi-
vidual to prison is more to deter him from committing more crimes … We know that they
won’t learn anything in prison … Sometimes the idea that we have is that we are protecting
the individual from himself…
Another goal that the prison can achieve is addiction treatment for the physical impe-
diment of continuing to use drugs – which, in practice, is not necessarily the case, given
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that Portuguese prisons are not absolute drug-free environments, drug treatments are not
available for all inmates who want to be treated, and prison is not the most adequate
context for effective treatment.
In my opinion, the prison has only one positive side, and that concerns drug addicts. Knowing
how hard it is to stop using, only when in jail and in a situation of a total absence of drugs,
some of them can do it.
Overall, there is the strongly emphasized idea that prison does not enable positive
special deterrence purposes or resocialization because there are so few positive resources.
And so, the resocialization of inmates during custody is a myth … because prisons are over-
crowded, there are no means, because monitoring is almost nonexistent, many people don’t
understand … it is a number of factors…
Furthermore, many judges highlighted that detention can do more harm than good to
inmates – the idea of prison as a school of crime.
As it is commonly said, a person goes to prison to learn the school of crime … When a prison
is only a storage for people, with no conditions … In truth, what we are doing is just to
protect society from those people, for a period, but in the end, I don’t know if they leave
better than when they entered. I think that many of them become worse because … they
used to know some delinquents but when they get out of there they know those delinquents
and many more, probably now the leaders, isn’t that right?
However, some judges also mentioned that regardless of how prisons function, it is the
individual who has the power and the ability to actively build his experience of reclusion.
This reveals a tendency to place the onus of the rehabilitation on inmates, whatever their
circumstances.
I think that idea of the prison as a school of crime is kind of a myth … the prison has already
got many individuals out of more trouble. And there are some guys that if they had been in
pre-trial detention, they wouldn’t have committed more than 20 or 30 crimes like they did …
besides, we cannot forget that it is the convicted himself who builds his own reclusion. So, if
he devotes himself to his resocialization, anyhow, the system obviously must help him …
alone, he won’t be able to do it all, but the system might try to help him and he can refuse
to collaborate. And we have examples of inmates that do what is proposed, even if it is col-
lecting training courses. Keep themselves active … and there the others who won’t accept
anything. And the system is the same for both, isn’t it? So, the penalty also starts from
them. Starts and ends … So, it is not good, but is not as bad as is commonly said either…
Some judges describe prison as the continuity, for many inmates, of a ‘life of leisure’,
with respect to where they came from and where they will go after serving their time,
more uprooted than before and with an increase in crime related skills. Accordingly, impri-
sonment is an ultimate solution that should only be used for very serious crimes or in situ-
ations in which all other possibilities have been exhausted. There were also references
claiming that prisons are a less evolved area in the system of justice because no better sol-
ution has appeared over time to address limited situations.
I think that with respect to penitentiary law, we are still in the Middle Ages. But for now, it is
what we have, the prison … many times, it imposes itself as the lesser evil, doesńt it?
A crucial point was the idea of a large divide between the judge who imposes the
penalty and the judge who controls its enforcement, with a loss of judicial purpose. As
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such, there is a general idea that judges are obliged to impose penalties, regardless of how
things operate (namely, in terms of enforcement, monitoring, etc.).
The personal experience of imposing imprisonment terms
Finally, the fourth category includes the issues related to judges’ personal experiences of
imposing prison sentences. Overall, we found two opposing views that were related to the
associated difficulty.
Some judges said that imposing a custodial sentence was not difficult or distressing, as
they safeguarded their attitudes about the fairness of the decision because the penalty
would only be utilized when no other option was suitable or when their task was
merely to define the sentence instead of enforcing the penalties.
It was never painful for me. I must be aware of what my job is. I can’t do my job and the job of 5
or 6 other people. Besides, when applying the law, I must adhere to what the law imposes me
to do. And not to consider the poor implementation of the penalty, right? So, I shouldn’t feel
the compunction of the inadequate enforcement of other persons. Nor can I justify that I don’t
impose a prison term because it is not properly applied. But I think that, not as a judge, but as a
citizen, I must intervene as much as possible … and as a judge, if I have a defendant reporting
any abuse from me, or a judicial agent, or another judge, whoever, I have the responsibility of
denouncing it … But it does not distress me to apply a prison term.
Other judges held the opposite position and stated that it was always painful because
the freedom of a human being was at stake. Many of these judges emphasized that the
difficulty occurs in the period prior to making the decision and that they are pacified
after making the decision.
In a certain way, it is always painful. And it is harder for me when the defendant overtly accepts
the decision … it is always distressful. But I don’t live chased by that … because the great
weariness happens before I get to the decision. When I made the decision, I turn off myself
from previous involvement … Because many times I decided for a prison term and then, in
the middle of the night, I changed the decision and suspended the imprisonment, as I
have done the contrary several times … So, for me, the difficulty happens before making
the decision in my mind. Then, saying it to the person … I think that if I make that decision
it is because I believe in it, so there is no constraint in pronouncing it …
There were also judges who distinguished between the painful situations of addressing
intermediate cases of illegality and serious crimes, specifically with respect to human
assets.
The hard cases are those that are not very serious, you know? Those situations when someone
gets arrested more due to recidivism … due to a circumstance, those are difficult situations,
aren’t they? … But when we are considering those severe penalties, of someone who brutally
kills another, rapes, I don’t know, I mean, in those cases it is not hard at all. Frankly I can’t say it
is hard for me. … In those when I am sure that person did it … The hard cases are the ones
of minor offences, like a series of robberies…
Discussion
Given the results from study 1 on the adequacy of the different penalties for different judi-
cial purposes and crimes, we highlight that there is a tendency for adequacy to be highly
rated in both cases, as there is an increase in the severity of the penalties. This increase in
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severity culminated with the valuation of the prison sentence as the most adequate, both
for different crimes and for different judicial purposes, with the exception of rehabilitation.
This result is not consistent with viewing imprisonment as a ‘last resort’ solution, as judges
referred to it in theoretical terms. Although they do not necessarily use imprisonment as a
default sentence, as they also choose for the alternatives available, judges definitively
show a preference for this sanction.
Judges preference for prison compared to non-custodial sentences and the perception
of that penalty as more adequate for recidivism cases, even in the case of minor offenses,
are also found in other studies (e.g. Maguire, 2010). Tata (2016) argues that the policy and
mentality that currently underlie the last resort use of prison is a problem that renders
custody as the default sentence because imprisonment must be imposed every time
the alternatives are not adequate. According to this author, we must invert this mentality
and specify circumstances and purposes as normally non-imprisonable. In turn, Tombs and
Jagger (2006) suggest another transformation, in which non-custodial sentences are the
norm from which any prison sentence would require justification. Our results, obtained
in a judicial reality where this suggestion already occurs, show that these efforts may
not be enough because sentencing justifications can easily be grounded in general and
individual deterrence purposes, specifically recalling the defense of the community’s
sense of security and belief in justice and the persistence of the offenses. Again, the sen-
tences’ theoretical justification might not reflect underlying intentions (Maguire, 2014),
which allows for a broader use of a prison sentence than as a last resort. As Goodman-Dela-
hunty and Sporer also discussed, ‘concerns have been raised that reasons articulated in
judicial decisions are crafted to withstand appeal and to fit the parameters of model defen-
sible legal guideline judgments but may not correspond with the decision-making process
itself’ (2010, p. 20).
To make prison sentences a last resort, an alternative could be rethinking sentencing
categories. For example, Portugal defines imprisonment and fines as primary penalties,
while others are categorized as alternative sanctions (Antunes, 2013). This definition
makes alternatives to function in reference to the primary sanctions.
Although these recategorizations might play an important role in constructing a
common ground, we argue that it may not be enough. Our results also show the relevance
of altering judges’ personal positions towards prison and other penalties, focusing on their
attitudes and not only on their practices and sentencing procedures. Then, we must be
able to identify those underlying attitudes and ideas to increase judges’ knowledge
through research-based training.
The categories of crimes that we used corresponded with the most common types of
crimes that were judged by these criminal judges. This may have led different judges to
consider different levels of severity for each crime, but this would not be consistent
with considering the prison sentence as the most adequate for all crimes.
The pattern of disagreement among the judges in this study is consistent with the
results from other research (e.g. Ifill, 2009; Lynch, 2012; Maguire, 2010; Posner, 2008).
Although this disagreement might be seen as a positive objective and something that
is ‘substantively desirable’ (Lynch, 2012, p. 36) for the assurance of diversity, in our
study this disagreement revealed opposite perspectives towards something that is
basilar to the sentencing decision – perceptions of the penalties, crimes and judicial pur-
poses. A similar pattern was reported in Maguire (2010) and Mackenzie (2005). These
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studies showed that, with the exception of imprisonment and suspended prison terms,
judges did not agree on the judicial purposes that penalties can achieve. Mackenzie
(2005) referred to a lack of consistency and accountability in applying sentencing aims
and purposes after describing how judges differed on aligning purposes with specific
offenses. This disagreement can be related to sentencing disparities and inconsistencies,
which suggests that judges’ perspectives influence their beliefs about the adequacy of the
distinct penalties to the different offenses and offenders (Mackenzie, 2005; Maguire, 2010).
The interviews from study 2 highlight several issues. We emphasize a certain degree of
naivety on certain issues, specifically social needs that are central to the offenders’ prog-
nosis and successful rehabilitation. For example, this occurred when judges revealed their
belief on the total absence of drugs in prison, a totally internal causality for rehabilitation,
and other aspects of the complex social world of offenders. Additionally, the prison sen-
tence is presented in a paradoxical way, sometimes as a place where individuals will
only get worse and sometimes as a penalty that achieves better results. This is consistent
with the dissociation between the responsibility for assigning a penalty and its enforce-
ment, which judges appear to accept. If it is understandable that judges must cope
with reality and with what is and is not part of their official duties, it is important to
note that they uncritically accept the discrepancy between their judicial purposes when
sentencing and the practical results of the penalties, which are often viewed as distinct
from the former. This appears to reflect judges’ denial of the final responsibility for their
decisions, which was described by Tombs and Jagger (2006). Specifically, we have
described the role distancing or the ‘selective interpretation of the world’ that was
described by Hogarth (1971): ‘Through selective interpretation of the world and their
relationship to it, magistrates protect themselves from acknowledging the harsh realities
that there are fundamental contradictions in the criminal justice system and that it is fre-
quently impossible for them to resolve them’ (Hogarth, 1971, p. 355). As privileged agents
in the judicial process, when the system reveals significant failures, such as no conditions
for fulfilling the sentencing objectives, it could be expected that judges would act, or at
least report the situation, rather than accepting it with no manifested action or criticism.
Overall, we found a skeptical perspective on the efficacy of the penalties, with excep-
tion to imprisonment. In contrast to the most recent views from criminological studies
(e.g. Lipsey & Cullen, 2007), several judges viewed the prison sentence as the most ade-
quate punishment for changing offenders’ behavior, as discussed by Cochran et al.
(2014) and for preventing new crimes. When discussing prison in general terms, several
judges stated that imprisonment is the only penalty that has an effect on individuals. In
addition to not being based on empirical data, this position is also inconsistent with
judges’ in-depth ideas on the fragilities of prisons in practice, which reveals an asymmetry
between the superficial and the in-depth discussion on prison features (Paternoster, 2010).
Specifically, the discrepancy between what prison is thought to be in the abstract, what it
is and can promote in practice2.
Indeed, research demonstrates that penalties and supervision have little (Paternoster,
2010) to no effect on the rate of reoffending. Imprisonment often results in a greater
rate of recidivism (Bales & Piquero, 2012; Ritchie, 2011) and a negative impact on
offenders, which is primarily due to an increased exposure to criminogenic risk factors
(Cullen et al., 2011). In contrast, corrections that are based on the rehabilitation of
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offenders, which do not characterize most correctional systems in western societies, have
had positive effects on offenders’ recidivism rates (Andrews & Bonta, 2010).
The widely held notion that penalties are ineffective appears to reflect judges’ disbelief
on the capacity of the criminal justice system to rehabilitate offenders. Some judges
believed that this skepticism resulted from their own professional experience, which is
consistent with the classic study of Bond and Lemon (1981). These authors found that
judges became less oriented to rehabilitation objectives (viewed this possibility with
more skepticism) with an increase in professional experience. Indeed, in their professional
experience, judges are presented with many offenders who reoffend and return to the
system, which increases their salience in the judges’ cognition. However, it is important
to acknowledge that this does not suggest that recidivism is a linear part of the
pathway for all offenders, but that the individuals who desist from committing crimes
do not return to the system. Thus, it is critical to examine the effects of sentencing experi-
ences and the danger of highlighting the most visible part of reality.
An important idea to highlight in this discussion is the ‘criminal justice funnel’. That is, in
all the phases of a criminal case processing, there are many decision-makers that obviously
influence the result of the process. Nevertheless, even being aware of this, penal judges
still have a central role in the final decision of those who reach that part of the judicial
process. Specifically, in the decision on the best penal sanction to apply to a specific
case, which is precisely where we locate our research goal, that is, exploring judges’
ideas about imprisonment. As Henham puts it, ‘sentencing performs a pivotal role in
the criminal justice process, representing the point at which the aims and purposes of pun-
ishment are given public expression, and providing a link between the rhetoric of punish-
ment and a site for assessment of its legitimacy’ (Henham, 2012, p.77). The specific
probability of a case to move on further in the process is something very difficult to
attain. However, what we realize is that the cases most likely to reach the phase of the
application of a criminal sanction are the ones related to the most visible forms of crimi-
nality, the most exposed to the formal justice mechanisms, and the most vulnerable defen-
dants to these mechanisms, namely the ones with lower resources and, then, with lower
possibilities to active the best defense possible.
Our data also demonstrated that judges seem to have some difficulties in defining the
point at which an offender must be stopped or put in prison. Indeed, this evaluation was
clearly subjective and was vulnerable to a high degree of variability, although many judges
appear to believe that such a common understanding exists (Tombs & Jagger, 2006).
Finally, these findings reinforce the idea that correctional policy and practice should be
evidence-based (Mackenzie, 2006), which is rarely practiced. Indeed, policy implications
from research indicate that prison does not reduce recidivism and, in some cases, may
have a criminogenic effect (Bales & Piquero, 2012; Gendreau et al., 1999), suggesting
that apart from the crime reduced through incarceration (due to incapacitation), using cus-
todial sanctions may have an unanticipated consequence of making society less safe
(Cullen et al., 2011). Conversely, many studies ‘confirm that the correctional goals of reha-
bilitation and treatment for offenders are workable. To rehabilitate does not mean to learn
how to behave in theory, but, rather, to be taught and trained in how to behave’ (Kolstad,
1996, p. 33). Based on these ideas, many studies currently sustain abolishing prison for
low-risk offenders and providing humane incarceration and meaningful rehabilitation
to the highest risk offenders (Minucci & Monster, 2004). Therefore, it does not seem
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wise to imprison offenders based on the specific deterrence effect of prison (Ritchie,
2011). However, if prison should only be used to punish and (temporarily) incapacitate
chronic and high-risk offenders (Gendreau et al., 1999), where does that leave us?
Although it may be used to pursue an end of general deterrence, caution related to
the type of offender and the crime should be exercised. In addition, caution is important
for ensuring that treatment does not simply become a euphemism for punishment
(Kaufman, 1973).
If correctional policy and practice were evidence-based and judges shared this knowl-
edge, we would probably see a decrease in imprisonment rates and prison terms, as well
as judges’ negative perceptions towards this sanction. However, for judges’ perceptions of
the prison sentence, we found contrasting evidence. Our results reveal that judges evalu-
ate prison sentences as more adequate and effective than the other penalties and are
skeptical to the rehabilitative potential of the criminal justice system. Moreover, the
penal purpose that is best addressed by a prison term is punishing the individuals.
Given the continued tendency to sentence individuals to prison despite its limitations
for promoting rehabilitation, judges still pursue, through sentencing, a punitive purpose
that focuses on sanctioning offenders rather than rehabilitating them (Tombs & Jagger,
2006). As such, Maguire (2014) discusses the existing consensus that judicial punitiveness
is a key explanatory variable for unraveling what is behind the failure of using prison as a
last resort. Mackenzie’s interviews (2005) revealed this issue, when one judge said that his/
her colleagues might not believe that they are sentencing based on retribution, when in
fact this was what they were doing.
However, judges’ training in the law should make them aware of those processes,
empower them to resist punitive urges that may influence the public (Cairns & Koehler,
2014), and empower them to think at a higher and more sophisticated level in ethical
terms. If sentences’ justifications are broad enough to allow for retribution and punitive-
ness to be surreptitiously exercised, as seems to be the case, sentencing systems are allow-
ing judges to punish convicts based on the purpose of retribution that they believe is
appropriate, which, in the words of Stephenson (1992), cannot make us uneasy.
Several issues to be explored in future studies raised from this research. First, exploring
judges’ ideas specifically on community sanctions, as an alternative to custodial sanctions,
and its obstacles. Second, doing a systematic identification of the sentencing purposes
included in the sentence decisions of imprisonment for different crimes. Finally, doing a
survey on inmates’ perceptions about the sentencing purposes they believe to be associ-
ated to the penalties they are serving, allowing to compare judges’ intentions and inmates’
perceived effects, in other words, comparing the theory and the application of the law.
Conclusion
Because judges are the agents who sentence, their ideas are practiced in the sentencing
process regardless of the distance between these ideas and actual criminological knowl-
edge on the effects and efficacy of correctional measures.
This highlights the importance of increasing judges’ training on criminological and
sociological issues as well as the importance of changing the influence of their personal
beliefs to positions that are closer to the scientific evidence while moving ‘towards
more certainty-oriented, crime-prevention strategies’ (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011, p. 14).
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As Cullen and colleagues asserted,
in the end it is essential to test our understandings, including those about prisons, with the
best scientific data available. And depending on what the evidence tells us, we need to
have the intellectual and moral courage to change our minds and our policies’ (Cullen
et al., 2011, p. 59).
Thus, we are arguing for a choice in the penalties that are grounded in their related pur-
poses and actual effects. Policy decisions should also ensure that the penalties in practice
are implemented in a manner that promotes the desired effects. We maintain that this
should be the way to map and fill the divide between the academic, practical and
policy levels to minimize the use of imprisonment.
Going back to the beginning, we finish quoting Hogarth, who argued that, ‘while it is
judges who must sentence, and offenders who must bear the brunt of such sentences,
it is society itself that pays the price and reaps the results’ (Hogarth, 1971, p. 398).
Notes
1. There are many additional authors who proposed distinct categorizations, such as McFatter
(1978), who only considered the three sentencing strategies of retribution, rehabilitation
and deterrence, and Mackenzie (2005), who replaced retribution with denunciation.
2. Foucault (1999) discusses several reasons that may justify why prisons did not trigger a strong
negative reaction by the criminal justice system, foreseeing it as the bleakest area of that
system.
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